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FRINGE ECONOMY LENDING AND OTHER ABERRANT
CONTRACTS: INTRODUCTION
SARAH HOWARD JENKINS *
Aberrant Contracts, rent to own agreements, third party legal lending
contracts, payday loans, and title loan—often referred to as “fringe banking” in the fringe economy, are contractual relationships that lack the characteristics of arms length, bargained for exchanges that dominate the focus
of general contract law as taught in most U.S. law schools. These atypical
agreements are, more often than not, used by individuals who lack the financial ability to otherwise acquire the goods or services obtained. The
loans themselves are generally “involves small dollar amount loans made
for short periods of time.” 1 Because these loans involve exorbitant fees and
interest rates, some view the businesses that provide these loans or services
as loan sharks, preying on the working poor by offering modern household
necessities—refrigerators, washers and dryers, services, or cash flow that
consumers need but are unable to acquire with credit cards, bank overdraft
protection, or traditional loans. On the other hand, advocates for these
businesses assert that the consumer adds value to their lives with the goods
or services provided that cannot be otherwise afforded; 2 the rates charged
reflect the risks undertaken in servicing this particular market.
This symposium begins with Professor Terrence Cain’s article entitled: Third Party Funding of Personal Injury Tort Claims: Keep the Baby
and Change the Bathwater. 3 Here, Professor Cain describes the specific
context of litigation loans acquired by tort plaintiffs from third parties in
anticipation of a recovery in a pending lawsuit. The dynamics of this setting are typical of most fringe economy agreements: a necessitous or financially constrained borrower, a ready and willing lender, and interest rates
that would astound a knowledgeable borrower, here a mere 280%, and that
entangle the borrower with debt that is difficult to eliminate. Professor Cain
* Charles C. Baum Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
1. Michael H. Anderson, An Economic Perspective on Subprime Lending, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
53, 57 (2013).
2. Michael H. Anderson, An Economic Investigation of Rent-to-Own Agreements, 89 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 141, 146-47 (2013).
3. Terrence Cain, Third Party Funding of Personal Injury Tort Claims: Keep the Baby and
Change the Bathwater, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11 (2013).
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advocates maintaining the service provided by the industry but insists that
the service must be subject to federal regulation. He concludes by proposing a model act for Congress as well as states to consider.
Professor Michael H. Anderson, an economist, weighs in suggesting
an historical symmetry between the ten-year period of the 1970’s and 80’s,
with its three recessions between 1973 and 1981, and our current economic
crisis in his essay on the subprime lending industry entitled: An Economic
Perspective on Subprime Lending. 4 He evaluates the common subprime
mechanisms—rent-to-own, pay day lending, pawn shops, and title pawn
lending. He concludes that rates between 200% and 1000% APR are a reality for borrowers who contract in these markets despite the original shortterm goal and low principal amount of the loan. His analysis suggests that
payday and pawn loans are the most egregious and calls for regulation of
the subprime lending industry.
Professor Amy Schmitz, in Females on the Fringe: Considering Gender in Payday Lending Policy, 5 assesses the prevailing data on payday
loans and concludes, as does Professor Anderson in his assessment of the
rent-to-own industry, 6 that the ills of payday lending disproportionately
impact women and their families. Professor Schmitz joins other symposium
authors in calling for regulation but goes beyond that call by suggesting
creative, realistic options, both community based and Federal, to address
the adverse impact of payday lending and to fill the void likely to be created by effective regulation of the payday lending industry. 7 Two thoughtful
essays follow Professor Schmitz’ offering potential solutions to the debt
crisis of fringe economy lending.
Timothy E. Goldsmith and Nathalie Martin share the results of their
empirical research on the public perception of and the need for interest rate
caps in their essay: Interest Rate Caps, State Legislation, and Public Opinion: Does the Law Reflect the Public’s Desires? 8 Goldsmith and Martin
add the results of their study of New Mexico consumers that 86% of participants thought that the rate caps should be imposed on short-term loans
with over 72% selecting 25% or less as the cap to the staggering statistics
from several states suggesting that the general public prefers reasonable

4. Anderson, supra note 1.
5. Amy Schmitz, Females on the Fringe: Considering Gender in Payday Lending Policy, 89
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 65 (2013).
6. Anderson, supra note 2.
7. See generally, Anderson, supra note 1; Cain, supra note 3; Schmitz, supra note 5.
8. Timothy Goldsmith & Nathalie Martin, Interest Rate Caps, State Legislation, and Public
Opinion: Does the Law Reflect the Public’s Desires?, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 115 (2013).
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caps on short-term loans like payday loans. 9 This accumulated data suggests that an accurate understanding of public perception should motivate
the various legislative bodies across the nation in states that do not currently cap store-front or short-term loans to change existing law.
Professor Anderson’s second essay, An Economic Investigation of
Rent-to-Own Agreements, 10 offers the rent-to-own paradigm and its demographics as a better approach to short term leading. The symposium
concludes the assessment of fringe economy lending as aberrant contracting with a lender perspective article that addresses the wisdom of securitizing the receivables from fringe lending. Professor Thomas E. Plank in his
article, Securitization of Aberrant Contract Receivables, 11 identifies the
goals and requirements for securitizing receivables and the issues that must
be addressed when considering the securitization of fringe banking receivables. Professor Plank concludes by discussing the risks inherent in fringe
banking receivables and the concerns that must be weighed to determine if
the benefits of securitization can be realized.
The next set of articles by Professors Woodward and Bowers address
other concerns with aberrant agreements, whether the term “aberrant” refers to fringe economy lending or mass marketed adhesion contracts:
choice of law and payment application. Professor Emeritus William
Woodward addresses the legal uncertainty inherent in the union of choice
of law provisions and arbitration of consumer claims in his essay, Legal
Uncertainty and Aberrant Contracts: The Choice of Law Clause. 12 He
offers legislation—non-waivable consumer protection statutes—as the sole
remedy “to resolve the extraordinarily complex legal problem that confronts a consumer when the vendor replaces local consumer protection with
that of another place through a contractual choice of law provision.” 13 Professor Woodward uses California’s non- waivable two-way fee-shifting
statute as an example to illustrate his position.
Professor Bowers in his article, Some Economic Insights Into Application of Payments Doctrine: Walker-Thomas Revisited. 14 posits that the
striking of the cross-collateral provision in the infamous Walker-Thomas

9. Id. at 120-29.
10. Anderson, supra note 2.
11. Thomas E. Plank, Securitization of Aberrant Contract Receivables, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
171 (2013).
12. William Woodward, Legal Uncertainty and Aberrant Contracts: The Choice of Law Clause,
89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 197 (2013).
13. Id. at 200-01.
14. James Bowers, Some Economic Insights Into Application of Payments Doctrine: WalkerThomas Revisited, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229 (2013).
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contract because it was unconscionable “relegates the plaintiff to the default provisions of the common law, which may be even more unfavorable
to the consumer than the stricken clause.” 15 Revised UCC Article 9 creates
an opportunity to address anew default application rules. Professor Bowers
argues persuasively that consumers have several reasons for preferring, in a
series of transactions with a given creditor—a fact pattern that often occurs
in the rent-to-own context, to have their property interests protected in the
last-purchased-collateral rather than the first.
Finally, the symposium concludes with other examples of contracts
deemed by leading contract and commercial law scholars as “aberrant.”
Professor Nancy Kim convincingly demonstrates that electronic contracts
and electronic modifications of contracts are inherently aberrant in her
article Situational Duress and the Aberrance of Electronic Contracts16 and
proposes an extension of the doctrine of duress as a defense in the electronic contracting context. Professor J. Lyn Entrikin tackles the monumental
task of advocating for change in the multifarious world of property taxes in
her extensive study entitled: Tax Ferrets, Tax Consultants, Bounty Hunters,
and Hired Guns: The Property Tax Netherworld Fueled by Contingency
Fees and Champertous Agreements. 17 Professor James J. White defines an
aberrant contract as an asymmetric one that begins with terms proposed to
consumers by powerful corporation on a “take it or leave it” basis. He considers an aberration of this model, the tenure contract, “executed between a
strong employer and a weak employee. But here the rule is reversed; the
employee, presumptively the weaker party, gets his terms.” 18 In his essay,
Tenure, The Aberrant Consumer Contract, Professor White considers three
issues: the origin of tenure, the terms of tenure, and its continued viability.
He concludes by advocating abolition of tenure because tenure “injures our
students, blocks the way to eager and highly competent professors, and
generally degrades the efficiency of our schools.” 19 The final submission in
this symposium is Professor Scott Burnham’s assessment of exculpatory
contracts as aberrant contracts. In his essay, Are You Free To Contract

15. Id. at 231.
16. Nancy Kim, Situational Duress and the Aberrance of Electronic Contracts, 89 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 265 (2013).
17. J. Lyn Entrikin, Tax Ferrets, Tax Consultants, Bounty Hunters, and Hired Guns: The Property Tax Netherworld Fueled by Contingency Fees and Champertous Agreements, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
289 (2013).
18. James J. White, Tenure, The Aberrant Consumer Contract, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 353, 353
(2013).
19. Id. at 378.
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Away Your Right To Bring A Negligence Claim?,20 he evaluates the three
prevailing approaches to the enforceability of exculpatory clauses and proposes an analytical framework for courts to use when evaluating the enforceability of these clauses.
These thoughtful articles and essays are only part of the conversation
in identifying solutions to the aberrancy of fringe economy lending and
other agreements that deviate substantially from the arm’s length, bargained-for exchange paradigm that is taught and upon which prevailing
doctrines used to police contracts are based. As the dialogue continues
either in response to the ideas and theories presented herein or as additions
to them, the engagement should serve as an impetus for change.

20. Scott Burnham, Are You Free To Contract Away Your Right To Bring A Negligence Claim?,
89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379 (2013).

